Toward a New Climate Game (2)
A Reciprocal Voluntary Agreement Back to Post #1 Feb 1, 2021 — In the prior post, I concluded that the UN climate game, since the signing of the Kyoto accord, has been
February 1, 2021
4:38 pm
Make Econ Scientific
A Reciprocal Voluntary Agreement Back to Post #1 Feb 1, 2021 — In the prior post, I concluded that the UN climate game, since the signing of the Kyoto accord, has been
Game theory assumes sociopathic players. That leads to cooperation failures in repeated games. Except it doesn’t. Not unless the players also know for sure that the other players are too.
Climate negotiations are a sort of prisoner’s dilemma, so we need to find a way to change the game or change the outcome of a prisoner’s dilemma. Douglas Hofstadter (of Scientific American
Chimps and people subscribe to similar codes of honor. It’s been built in for 7 million years, and it may be just what we need to enforce a cooperative climate treaty.
The “prisoner’s dilemma” is a famous game, and standard game theory predicts the prisoners will never cooperate if they must play without communicating. But here’s a real-world case, and guess what.
The “motivation function” is an improved utility function in that it takes account of both wealth and relative wealth. But as specified by Bolton and Ockenfels it is not consistent between games (economies) with different numbers of players.
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