Toward a New Climate Game (2)
A Reciprocal Voluntary Agreement Back to Post #1 Feb 1, 2021 — In the prior post, I concluded that the UN climate game, since the signing of the Kyoto accord, has been
February 1, 2021
4:38 pm
Make Econ Scientific
A Reciprocal Voluntary Agreement Back to Post #1 Feb 1, 2021 — In the prior post, I concluded that the UN climate game, since the signing of the Kyoto accord, has been
First in a series on new climate-cooperation experiments — Why We Need to Change the Climate Game
I’ve been curious about thorium for years. Now, Andrew Yang proposes to spend $50 billion researching thorium molten salt reactors by 2025.
Game theory assumes sociopathic players. That leads to cooperation failures in repeated games. Except it doesn’t. Not unless the players also know for sure that the other players are too.
Here’s a fun interview with Freeman Dyson, the guy that explained Richard Feynman to the world (and improved his math). He also recently discovered some very interesting new properties of repeated prisoner-dilemma games.
In January 2015 History is the key In 1980, the Saudi’s oil minister, Yamani, warned OPEC it was trying to keep the price too high. They didn’t listen, and all agreed to
Climate negotiations are a sort of prisoner’s dilemma, so we need to find a way to change the game or change the outcome of a prisoner’s dilemma. Douglas Hofstadter (of Scientific American
Table of Contents