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Steven  Stoft
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  Transmission Expansion for Renewable Energy Scale-Up A World Bank Report, Marcelino Madrigal and Steven Stoft, June 2011.  
Power System Economics:  Just Out in Persian (Mar. 2011)
  About the Global Energy Policy Center
(The GEP Center has now been disolved and the project moved to
I founded the GEP Center in November 2009 to help correct the strategic mistakes that underlie the Copenhagen/Kyoto failure. These are understood by quite a few economists, political scientists, and others — Stiglitz, Schelling and Barrett, to name a few. But there appears to be no other Center devoted to collecting and organizing the key ideas behind this strategic perspective and no other Center with a coherent proposal for a global climate-and-energy policy. Most climate proposals do not consider energy except as a source of CO2, and most do not reflect sound game theory.

Pricing, a Better Climate Commitment
Peter Cramton and Steven Stoft, The Economists' Voice: Vol. 7 : Iss. 1, Article 3.
March 23, 2009. This is the best introduction to Flexible Global Carbon Pricing (FGCP), a strategic alternative to the Kyoto Protocol. FGCP replaces divisive international caps with a commitment to carbon pricing. Under this commitment countries are free to use cap-and-trade, carbon taxes, or feebates to meet their commitment.
The result is a commitment with a far more predictable cost to countries that can be achieved with caps. This makes it possible to use the low cost of carbon pricing as a selling point for FGCP.
Table 1  Carbon Cost Green Fund Total Cost
 India   0.8 ˘  –1.7 ˘ –0.9 ˘
 China   4.1 ˘   0.0 ˘   4.1 ˘
 U.S. 16.4 ˘   6.6 ˘ 23.0 ˘
As Table 1 shows, pure carbon pricing—without subsidies—is incredibly cheap. The total cost to the U.S. is 23 ˘ per person per day. That's about the cost of a tea bag. This is for a global carbon price target of $30/ton and a Green Fund which is generous enough to pay India twice what it costs India to implement the $30 carbon prices. This is based on EPA's formula for abatement costs.
Beyond Kyoto:
Flexible Carbon Pricing for Global Cooperation

November 17, 2009. A new short book explains what to do now that cap-and-trade has hit a dead end at Copenhagen. Read the abstract and download it at SSRN
Also visit the new website on how to set a global carbon price. The trouble with Copenhagen is not a disagreement over the need for strong policy, as environmentalists seem to think. The problem is that the world cannot agree on how too cooperate. The roadblocks are costs and fairness. US Policy is not helping.
  Visit the Global Energy Policy Center
The Carbon / Energy Policy Blog       continues ...
How to Fix the Climate and Charge it to OPEC
By Steven Stoft, with assistance from Dan Kirshner
Summary for Policy Makers
Read it for free on Google.
The House has passed a $100-billion-a-year cap-and-trade bill. In December Obama will send a team to Copenhagen to negotiate Kyoto II. Carbonomics explains what will work, what won't and who will be helped and hurt. It explains why a cap ...   more >>
The French version: Dépasser Copenhague
Electricity Markets
Power System Economics
Power System Economics, Available in English, Chinese and Russian
Also available in Croatian and Farsi.      Find the Missing Chapters >>        
  Forward Capacity Markets
Electricity markets have had their problems: price spikes, market power, overbuilding, under-investment—all caused by attempts to use spot markets with flawed demand to solve the adequate-capacity problem. Electricity "experts" are fond of saying:
1. "Competitive spot markets induce optimal capacity." (economists)
This is meant as a reply to engineers and regulators who say
2. "Electricity markets need help building optimal (adequate) capacity."
But the word "optimal," in result #1, has nothing to do with "optimal" in concern #2. Result #1 is actually true only under the strict assumption that capacity is more than adequate and provides 100% protection from supply shortfalls. Then, result #1 tells us, the spot market will build capacity not for reliability, but to the point where long- and short-run marginal costs are equal—that is economically efficient (optimal). This confusion has lasted 10 years.
When economists say "optimal" they mean economically optimal assuming there is always a market-clearing price. When engineers say "optimal" they mean the optimal level of involuntary load shedding (1-day-in-ten-years), in other words, the optimal frequency of market breakdowns—times when there is no market clearing price. The economic concept has nothing to do with the engineering concept. There is no economic theory stating that a market can optimize the amount of time during which the market will fail to clear. This idea is pure nonsense.
It's time for some "experts" to take a peek at an undergrad econ text.  Markets can help...

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China and India have nixed caps. Without these caps, Kyoto fails. What can be done?
Carbonomics explains "wrecking" the economy, "peak oil," caps, carbon taxes, and Kyoto.
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