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A Few Key Ideas from Carbonomics
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Carbonomics presents a systematic analysis rather than the usual laundry list of favored technologies. This page presents a few key ideas from that analysis.
1. Cooperation between the Two Energy Camps (Chp.1)
One camp backs climate stability, the other, energy security. Neither is cooperating. Until they do, energy policy is doomed, and OPEC and Big Fossil will keep winning. Fortunately, the better energy solutions work for both camps. Carbonomics carefully sorts these out.
2. A Consumers' Cartel: Charge It to OPEC and Cut Carbon Emissions
Kissinger formed an international consumer's cartel to fight OPEC. But just like Kyoto it was designed to raise the price of fossil fuel so we would consume less. The goals are different, but they work on the same principle—reduced consumption. One organization can be both. Think of it as a "climate cartel." This works for both energy camps, and helps national and international cooperation. (Chps. 1, 8, 13*, 29*)
3. The Carbon Untax (Chps. 7, 16*, 17*, 18*)
Backed by famous climate scientist James Hansen, a carbon tax works by making fossil fuel more expensive. But once the money is collected, it has done it's job, and the government has a lot of money. That sounds expensive. But it doesn't have to be. Just give the money back on an equal-per-person basis. (As long as we give it back equally and not in proportion to fossil fuel burned, it will retain its full strength.)
4. The Great Cost Confusion (Chp.22*)
This is the flip side of the untax. Most pundits say "A low price on carbon will do almost nothing, and a high price is way too expensive." What do they mean by expensive? They are thinking like this: A high price would collect $300 billion per year for the government and that's too expensive. Sure it is—if you throw it all away (or give it to special interest lobbyists). The confusion is to think collecting the money is a cost. The cost is wasting it—so just give it back.
5 The Race to Fuel Economy (Chp.20*)
Fuel economy standard have flopped. (1) they hurt GM, (2) they make GM the "expert" on standards. For 30 years the Big Three blocked every increase in standards. Solution: (1) Don't set any standard, and (2) don't hurt GM. No standard? Races have no standards. You just have to beat the competition. So use race, and make the losers pay for the prizes of the winners. Define the winner as the one who improves most. GM has lots of room to improve. Read the details in Carbonomics.
6 No Carbon Cap for China (Chp.23)
If you were so poor you only used the fossil fuel that the average American used in 1880, but you were working hard and getting richer, would would want the US telling you to cap your fossil fuel use below the 1880 level? China has been saying "absolutely no" to this idea for 15 years. They actually mean "No." It's pretty simple. Same for India. So forget carbon caps—without China on board, any climate policy will fail.
7 Global Carbon Pricing (Chp.24)
China says they will make a binding commitment—just not to a cap. Our top economists from left, right and center (Stiglitz, Mankiw, and Nordhaus) agree on the answer. Get the world to agree on a carbon price. Countries can do that with a tax, an untax, or even a carbon cap if they want. If China agrees to the same tax on carbon as the U.S., nothing stops them from becomes as rich as the U.S. They can live with that.
* Indicates chapter is focussed on the idea.
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http://stoft.com/p/78.html | 03/12/10 21:54 GMT
Modified: Sun, 05 Jul 2009 21:59:40 GMT
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China and India have nixed caps. Without these caps, Kyoto fails. What can be done?
Carbonomics explains "wrecking" the economy, "peak oil," caps, carbon taxes, and Kyoto.
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