Carbonomics
National and International Energy Policy
The Copenhagen Climate-Change Summit 2009
Steven Stoft
 
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Reinventing Kyoto: Flexible Global Carbon Pricing
The Flexible approach provides: (1) Real commitment. (2) Help for poor countries — provided they commit. (3) The most-cost effective policies. (4) The broadest coverage.
 
 
  Reinventing Kyoto
1. China, India, etc. have rejected caps.
2. They emit over half of GHGs. Their half is growing 7 times faster.
Without caps and without commitment, what can work?
•    Offsets?  Too expensive, corrupt and inefficient = 10 times too expensive.
•    Import duties on China etc.?  No. Exports are a small part of the problem.
•    Voluntary emission cuts?  No. The U.S. and China have failed spectacularly.
3. Nothing within the Kyoto Protocol can work, since caps have failed.
4. Kyoto was right — commitments are essential.
5. With quantity commitment ruled out — Carbon Pricing remains.
 
 
  Sectoral Crediting Mechanism (SCM) to Replace CDM (hopefully)    PDF
September 15, 2009. Kyoto's CDM offsets discourage broad climate policy cooperation, and they can't be used to pay for it. A new approach, SCM, pays for carbon reductions from an entire sector of a developing country. It's better, but still dangerous. To succeed we need to plan how this turns out before getting boxed in. more >>
 
 
  How Offsets Defeated the Kyoto Protocol    PDF
June 29, 2009. Kyoto's international offsets are paying poor countries not to cooperate. This short paper shows why the rejection of caps and inherent problems with offsets have doomed the Kyoto protocol.
 
 
  Flexible Global Carbon Pricing    PDF
June 29, 2009. Kyoto was right; global commitments are necessary. With caps ruled out for poor countries, Flexible Global Carbon Pricing, is the only option left. Pricing includes both caps (for Europe) and taxes (for poor countries). This paper explains in details how such a system could work. Carbonomics, Part 4 (read for free) presents this material for the non-specialist.
 
 
  Why Poor Countries Would Likely Accept a Carbon Tax
Environmentalists love caps because they give environmental certainty. But they ignore the desires and fears of poor countries. China and India are offended by the idea of being capped at the level of U.S. emissions in the 1800's. And caps are a huge financial burden if a country's growth takes off as China's has.
A carbon tax would be set at the same level for all countries, so it would be clear that poor countries could achieve our income level.
Even so, more inducement to cooperate is needed. And, it's worth it. First, the poorest countries, such as India, have done almost no damage and should be helped financially. Since they get to keep all of their carbon tax revenues, this will not be expensive.
China, which has emission above the world average, should not be paid to cooperate. But Flexible Carbon Pricing is designed to reduce the world price of oil—something that is very important to China. Only by helping to achieve global cooperation can it gain this benefit.
If it was worth asking poor countries to accept a cap, it is certainly worth asking them to accept a carbon tax. This is the only remaining path to systematic global commitments, and it makes no sense to ignore it.
 
 


http://stoft.com/p/127.html | 03/12/10 12:56 GMT
Modified: Wed, 16 Sep 2009 05:14:04 GMT
 
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China and India have nixed caps. Without these caps, Kyoto fails. What can be done?
Carbonomics explains "wrecking" the economy, "peak oil," caps, carbon taxes, and Kyoto.
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